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This article uses combined household- and community-level data collected from the Maule Region (VII) 
of Chile to evaluate factors affecting the decision to participate in yearly irrigation maintenance activities, 
and the influence of current behavior on farm revenues. Empirical results indicate that water user 
association characteristics explain much of the variation in participation decisions, contribution amounts, 
variable input purchases, and subsequent farm revenues.  
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Water regulation has a deep and storied history in Chile, dating back nearly 200 years. From the first 
known water decree of 1819 to the renowned National Water Code of 1981, Chile has steadily earned 
international recognition for its innovative and market-oriented approach to water management. Today, 
water rights in Chile, in law, are fully transferable and separable from land, tradable through market 
negotiations, and independent of land use.  
Theoretically, a market-based approach to the management of resources, particularly water, has 
many advantages over public management. When markets function correctly, the price reflects scarcity, 
and thus the opportunity cost of the resource. Optimally behaving individuals will buy and sell the 
resource until their marginal costs are equated to marginal benefits. Incentives to overuse the resource are 
reduced because the price reflects the negative externalities normally associated with overuse. Similarly, 
incentives to underinvest in the maintenance of irrigation infrastructure are reduced. Hence, overall 
economic efficiency should increase under a market-based approach.  
However, markets do not always function perfectly. In the case of water markets, additional 
investments must be made in infrastructure and technology to ensure the flow and monitoring of the water 
across households and geographic areas. A variety of institutions are necessary at the national, state, and 
local level. Moreover, proper balance must be maintained between private and public interests to keep the 
market functioning. Despite Chile’s advanced system of water management, in which local Comunidades 
de Agua (CdAs), or water communities, and their umbrella organizations manage the majority of local 
infrastructure, Bauer (1997) finds that geographic, infrastructural, legal, and administrative barriers 
greatly limit the amount of water traded. 
In rural areas, where water tends to be traded less and is mostly used as an essential farm input 
via irrigation canals, CdAs have gained recognition as an alternative to national or state-run resource 
management institutions (Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997). Because rural communities tend to share irrigation 
infrastructure, which transforms the water into a common-pool resource, CdAs face many of the classical 
problems of collective action in their management (see Ostrom 1990).  
From a household perspective, water users must decide whether or not to contribute to jointly 
used infrastructure. In communities where punishment for not contributing is rare or group size is large, 
incentives exist to free ride on the contributions of others. If monitoring of resource use is absent or weak, 
headenders (those at the front of the canal) have incentives to overuse the resource and undermaintain the 
infrastructure, imposing an externality on tailenders (those at the end of the canal), particularly in regions 
where market infrastructure to facilitate water trades is absent. Heterogeneity among users, in terms of the 
quality and quantity of land endowments, as well as human capital and the opportunity costs of labor, lead 
to differences in the marginal productivity of water and thus different incentives to use and maintain 
shared resources and infrastructure. Ultimately, the characteristics of the household, the community, and 
the CdA will influence the contribution decision (Fujiie et al. 2005; Ostrom and Gardner, 1993).  
From the CdA’s perspective, leveraging funds and maintaining canals will thus critically depend 
on the CdA’s ability to coordinate support from a critical mass of heterogeneous users. Management 
skills, membership size, social connections, and regional history are a few of the many characteristics that 
will influence coordination efforts. If too few individuals contribute, maintenance funds and labor may be 
underprovided, causing existing facilities to deteriorate or even collapse and generating potential water 
shortages at the community and household level. Coordination of households’ contributions to 
infrastructure maintenance is essential to the proper management of water as well as to the revenues of 
farmers reliant upon irrigation as an essential input.  
The purpose of this study is to analyze the interplay of CdAs and water users in the Maule Region 
(VII) of Chile. Specifically, the study is concerned with answering the following questions:  
1.  Which household and CdA characteristics influence the type (labor/money) and amount of 
participation selected by households?  




3.  How are variable input purchases and farm revenues influenced by factors driving the 
participation decision?  
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a theoretical model that integrates standard 
features of common-pool resource management problems. Predictions are made regarding the behavior of 
water users under a variety of circumstances. Section 3 reviews the area of study and the institutional 
framework of the water management system. The fourth section discusses the data used and relates the 
predictions of the theoretical model to key variables used in the analysis. Section 5 reviews the empirical 
approaches employed, and Section 6 summarizes the results. The final section offers conclusions and 




2. CONCEPTUAL  FRAMEWORK 
Relevant Theoretical and Empirical Literature Review 
The modern theoretical underpinnings of common-pool resource management date back to Gordon 
(1954), Olson (1965), and Hardin (1968). The early literature focused on the behavior of self-interested 
individuals, predicting that unless group size is small or coercion mechanisms exist, individuals will not 
act to achieve common or group interests. Sandler (1992) synthesized the advances in understanding 
individual collective action since Olson’s seminal work, mainly in the provision of public goods. 
Sandler’s work emphasizes that few general predictions can be made regarding factors affecting the 
successful provision of public goods because outcomes will depend on the underlying technology 
generating the public good, strategic assumptions made about interacting agents, and agents’ tastes and 
preferences. Baland and Platteau (1999) specifically evaluate how heterogeneity in wealth may or may 
not hinder successful collective action. To the extent that the wealthy gain more at the margin by 
provision of the public good, they may provide a large share of the good themselves; however, to the 
extent that the wealthy have greater opportunities to substitute for the collective good, collective action 
may be harder to sustain. In the context of irrigation user groups, Repetto (1986) modeled the negative 
impacts on individuals’ incentives to participate in collective action where links with higher-level 
organizations (usually government agencies) were weak. 
At the group level, Ostrom’s (1992) seminal work on self-governing irrigation groups lays out 
eight design principles hypothesized to foster successful irrigation use and maintenance activities at the 
level of the water user association (WUA). These factors include clearly defined boundaries, proportional 
equivalence between the costs borne by members and the benefits they receive, collective choice 
arrangements, monitoring systems, graduated sanctions for enforcement, conflict resolution mechanisms, 
an external authority that either passively grants or actively supports members’ right to self-organize, and 
the nested institutions required to ensure that management of complex irrigation systems occurs at the 
“right” level.  
There is also a large body of empirical literature examining the success of collective action in 
managing irrigation systems, of which we will mention but a few examples.
1 Gulati, Meinzen-Dick and 
Raju (2005) present detailed analysis concerning the management of irrigation systems in India. Results 
indicate that the relationship between the WUA and the higher-level government agencies responsible for 
water flow and maintenance of primary canals affects intra-WUA capacity to support successful 
collective action; the importance of the links with higher-level organizations is also captured in Lam 
(1998), Rice (1997), and Wade (1995). Internal factors affecting WUA success include whether the 
WUA-managed canal covered just one village or multiple villages (as covering multiple village reduces 
effectiveness); whether other important social organizations were located in the village and whether a 
traditional leader or college graduates were present in the community (all of which are hypothesized to 
reduce the transaction costs of meeting and coordination); and whether the group was sufficiently large 
and close to a market, indicating that economies of scale in providing collective goods and services were 
particularly important, especially where crop returns were higher. Results obtained by Fujiie et al. (2005) 
indicate that when irrigation associations have many members, and when the ratio of nonfarm households 
is high, the collective action needed to maintain canals is difficult to organize and sustain; thus, 
economies of scale can be outweighed by increased coordination, monitoring, and enforcement costs. A 
number of authors have also found that social and/or economic heterogeneity has a negative impact on the 
functioning of WUAs, including Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan (2002), Khwaja (2000), Lam (1998), and 
Tang (1992). 
                                                      





The theoretical models discussed above are generally based on cooperative or non-cooperative game 
theory and concentrate on the single decision regarding how much of the public good to provide. Water is 
but one input into crop production, however, and in this section we develop a two-person, two-input non-
cooperative model of farmers’ decisions to provide a public good and purchase private inputs. 
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output price is normalized to 1;  i k   is the variable input of the i-th player, the use of which does not affect 
others’ profits directly;  i w  is effective irrigation water applied, which is a function of the contributions of 
the N irrigation user group members in maintaining the irrigation canals; 
hh
i Z and  c C  are vectors of 
household- and community-level characteristics that affect the profitability of agricultural production; 
WUA
j Z is a vector of the irrigation user group characteristics; and,  k c  and  x c are the unit costs of the two 
variable inputs, respectively. Essentially, we can think of   as purchased crop inputs and   as the value of 
the contribution to operating and maintaining the canal infrastructure. 






























































































. These conditions ensure that each individual’s agricultural 
production function is strictly concave in the two inputs, that water and the purchased input are gross 
substitutes in production, and that contributions to maintaining the irrigation canal generate a pure public 
good via perfectly substitutable contributions among members. Suppressing household and community 






ii i i i k i x i kx
i
f kw x ck c x 

 
   
  
 
this results in the following first-order conditions (FOCs): 
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and similarly for each player. 
Next consider the social optimizer’s problem, which, given that agents are homogeneous, is the 
same as joint maximization. This is written as follows: 
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and similarly for each i. 
Comparing the derivatives with respect to  i x  for the individual versus the social optimizer 
(comparing equations [1] and [3]), we immediately note that [1] < [3] when evaluated at the same  , ii x k  

















where SO and NC in the superscript refer to the inputs resulting under the social optimum and non-
cooperative game, respectively. If second-order conditions are satisfied, then the only possible solution is 
for  
NCS O
ii x x   and 
NCS O
ii kk  .
2 Thus, both private and public inputs are lower than optimal and total 
revenues are also lower than would be the case under the social optimum. 
Extensions to the simple model above would include allowing for heterogeneity across players. 
First consider the simplification in which water is the only choice variable, and is given. In the two-player 
case, and assuming that player one uses water more productively than player two, the following results: 
12
NCN C
x x FOC FOC   
In this case, we obtain the standard result in the two-player game that the more productive player 
would be “exploited” by the less productive player, since the first player would have greater contributions 
in equilibrium. Considering now the private input,  i k , the decision for both players would depend on 
whether  12 x x  with heterogeneity were greater or less than 12 x x  where players are homogeneous. With 
linear reaction functions, for instance,  12 x x   would be the same under both heterogeneity and 
homogeneity, and thus  i k  would be unchanged.
3 Another source of heterogeneity arises from the location 
of the irrigator along the irrigation canal. Every irrigator has an incentive to keep the shared canal or 
canals clean above his or her own lateral, but the marginal incentives to do so will be greater for 
tailenders than for headenders, to the extent that the marginal return to keeping the canals well maintained 
increases as the water passing through declines (compare Freeman 1990).  
An additional extension is to consider the game in a dynamic framework. The focus in this paper 
is on evaluating factors affecting the decision to participate in yearly maintenance activities; the 
“impacts” of current behavior occur in one period, with no further impacts on next-period production. In 
other words, there are no dynamic externalities. In a repeated game, then, the Folk Theorem tells us that 
                                                      
2 Because we assume that contributions to irrigation maintenance are perfectly substitutable, and that they generate a pure 
public good, second-order conditions for the four-equation system will be satisfied whenever second-order conditions are met for 
the corresponding two-equation individual maximization problem. Also note that this game has a unique solution; in other words, 
it has a “prisoner dilemma”-like incentive structure (compare Dasgupta and Heal 1979) and not a “coordination” type structure. 










, that is, increasing effective water availability increases with 
contributions at a decreasing rate, which seems the most realistic assumption in this context.  
3 The reaction functions will themselves be a function of the substitutability between water and other inputs in production. 
Where, as here, substitutability is limited, it is more likely that total contributions will remain unchanged. Total contributions are 




socially optimal maintenance levels can be achieved, but so can a bounded but infinite set of maintenance 
levels, including the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium. However, most irrigators form water user groups 
to manage these incentives and coordinate actions to reach the repeated-game possibility of socially 
optimal maintenance levels. That is the case in our study area, where the CdAs are the WUAs.  
The goal of a WUA is to ameliorate directly the incentives to underprovide contributions to 
irrigation maintenance, which should also indirectly increase use of the private input and thus total output 
as well. The ability of the WUA to do so will depend on its ability to collect contributions, which, 
following McCarthy, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (1998), should depend on the incentives of group members 
to contribute or not contribute, as well as on the community-level characteristics discussed above.  
The most important factors in our study area are the number of members, economic 
heterogeneity, and CdA links to other organizations in the irrigation scheme. There is limited social 
heterogeneity in the study area, and the roles and responsibilities of the CdAs are recognized in law. The 
CdA makes decisions regarding the level of monetary and/or labor contributions to request of members, 
and members subsequently decide on their contributions. While nonpayment of quotas for water rights 
made to higher-level water user organizations may lead to termination of irrigation water in the study 
area, we observed few punishments or attempts (other than through moral suasion) to force compliance 
with CdA contributions. The CdA thus chooses the value of contributions that maximizes the effective 
water supply for users given the costs of monitoring and enforcing those contributions.  
Thus, the CdA chooses 
*
CdA x  as a function of the characteristics of the users (e.g., the number of 
users and economic heterogeneity), the characteristics of the water resources effectively available to the 
community (e.g., the location of the CdA canal within the irrigation system, the functioning of the higher-
level irrigation authority in terms of operation and maintenance of the primary canals, and their links to 
neighboring CdA irrigation authorities in operation and maintenance), and the decision-making rules used 
by the CdA (e.g., whether votes or consensus are relied on to reach decisions). These factors comprise the 
vector 
WUA Z in the profit function given above. Thus, the reduced form input and crop revenue equations 
can be written as: 
* (, , , , )
hh WUA
i j ckx xf ZZ C c c 
 (5) 
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3. REGIONAL  OVERVIEW 
The study focuses on the Maule Region (VII) of Chile. Located in central Chile and bisected by the 
Maule River, from which the region takes its name, the area is predominantly rural. Agricultural 
production, for both domestic and export purposes, is one of the primary economic activities. Due to the 
semiarid environment, irrigation water is an essential input into the agricultural production function and is 
delivered by a variety of mechanisms. Figure A.1. in the appendix provides a detailed view of the area. 
The institutional setup of the private water sector in Chile is organized in a hierarchical manner, 
with some overlap in organizational responsibility (Berger et al. 2007). At the local community level, 
water users are organized into Comunidades de Agua (CdAs). These groups are primarily responsible for 
distributing water to users’ plots, maintaining secondary and tertiary irrigation channels, and collecting 
fees for higher-level organizations. At the next highest level, Associacións de Canalistas (AdC, canal 
associations) and/or Juntas de Vigilancia (JdV, watch committees) are compromised of CdAs receiving 
water from one irrigation channel. In some cases, a CdA may belong to an AdC, which may in turn 
belong to a JdV, while in other cases, a CdA may belong directly to a JdV; this generally depends on 
whether the CdA receives water through the main canal or a secondary channel. These bodies mainly 
oversee the distribution of water into canals serving the CdAs and the maintenance of primary channels, 
as well as managing the distribution of water from larger bodies of water (e.g., streams, reservoirs, and 
lakes) to primary channels. The AdCs and JdVs may also provide additional services to CdAs; for 
instance, some JdVs have permanent hydrological engineers on staff who can provide advice to CdAs 
considering alternative infrastructure upgrades or investments, some have developed sophisticated 
computer databases that are used to provide strategic planning and investment information, and others 
organize various maintenance tasks for the CdAs themselves. Finally, in some cases CdAs receive water 
directly from rivers or streams, or from spillovers from other CdAs; in these cases, the local CdA is not 
linked to either an AdC or JdV. Whereas all the CdAs that belong to a JdV or AdC are formally 
registered, five of the CdAs that are not directly tied are not formally registered, and thus are not legally 
recognized WUAs; however, individual farmers’ rights to water may still be recognized, with the possible 
exception of spillover rights. Because we do not further distinguish between membership in either a JdV 
or AdC, hereafter we simply use “JdV” for convenience, even though the CdA may actually belong to 





While theoretical models provide a foundation for examining and predicting a household’s contribution 
decision, data capturing the actual conditions of the environment permit the testing of theoretical results 
through statistical inference. The data used in the study are from two surveys administered under the 
auspices of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). The purpose of the surveys was to 
collect information on the empirical conditions of the water management institutions (primarily CdAs) 
and households. As a first step in data collection, lists of all CdAs were obtained from all relevant JdVs in 
the study region; these lists included all CdAs in the JdVs’ areas of influence, whether or not the CdAs 
actually formally belonged to the JdVs. Next, from the list of CdAs, 35 were randomly selected and 
interviewed. During each CdA interview, enumerators collected lists of all households holding water 
rights within the CdA. From these lists 8–12 households were randomly selected and interviewed. 
Information from both the household and CdA level were integrated to form a final data set, which 
contains 318 households falling within the jurisdiction of 35 CdAs distributed across five JdV areas. 
Comunidades de Agua 
While every household falls within a CdA jurisdiction, and each CdA within a JdV jurisdiction, only 19 
of the 35 CdAs are members of their respective JdVs. In total, 174 households are members of CdAs that 
are also members of JdVs. This leaves 144 households as members of CdAs that are not directly tied to 
their local JdVs. As discussed in the section on the empirical approach, the CdA’s membership status 
within a corresponding JdV may influence a household’s decision to provide monetary or labor support to 
the local CdA, since this support will be in addition to quotas paid to the JdV. As noted above, besides 
ensuring the operation and maintenance of the primary canal, JdVs may also provide information and 
technical services, and may help organize—or even manage—maintenance and repair of the secondary 
canal system, so that accounting for membership in a JdV is required to control for household-level 
contributions to the CdA. The potential impact of membership in a JdV on overall expenditures for 
maintenance and repair are reflected in the total monetary contributions made by irrigation users. Table 1 
below presents descriptive statistics on users’ contributions to the CdA and the JdV. Using the daily 
agricultural wage rate, the value of labor is far higher for users belonging to CdAs that do not belong to a 
JdV than for those that belong to a JdV—12,653 Chilean pesos (CP) versus 4,851 CP, a difference that is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In terms of cash contributions, for users in CdAs that are 
part of a JdV the average figure is 12,624 CP, compared to 27,449 CP for users whose CdAs do not 
belong to a JdV, which is also significant at the 1 percent level. The total value of contributions is more 
than double; however, where a CdA belongs to a JdV, the quota is nearly the same as the total value of 
contributions for those whose CdA does not belong to a JdV, so that total contributions are higher for 
users who belong to a CdA that belongs to a JdV. Net revenues per hectare are also higher for those 






Table 1. User contributions to CdA and JdV  
Source: Authors 
As noted above, one factor distinguishing CdAs is their relationship with higher-level 
organizations, and whether or not they are registered (most are registered, but many are not formally 
linked to higher-level organizations). From the literature review, it appears that the most important factors 
affecting collective action in such organizations are membership size and heterogeneity among members. 
The smallest CdA in our sample had just 10 members, whereas the largest had 200; the mean was 40 
members. As a measure of economic heterogeneity, we asked about the smallest and largest landholdings 
in the community; landholdings ranged from 1.5 hectares to 200 hectares, with an average of 64 hectares. 
Following Ostrom’s design principles, as discussed above, internal structures may also affect 
households’ decisions to participate in collective action. In terms of water allocation rules, all but one 
CdA followed a “by turn” distribution system, so there was very little differentiation along this 
dimension. In terms of monitoring and enforcement, all but two communities relied solely on “moral 
suasion”; even if a potential sanction was mentioned, very few sanctions were levied. Thus, CdAs did not 
differ along this dimension. The CdAs did differ in terms of whether or not decisions are made 
predominantly by vote or by consensus, and how actively the president interacts with other CdA 
presidents, higher-level water user organizations, and relevant government agencies. Decisions are taken 
by consensus in 14 of the communities.
4  The “connectivity” of the president with representatives of other 
water user organizations is captured by the number of different representatives that were met with during 
the past year; on average, CdA presidents met with just 0.4 representatives, with the number ranging from 
0 to 3. Of the four unregistered CdAs, three in fact had no recognized “president” or indeed any formal 
CdA organization, and information on the structure and functioning of these CdAs is thus not applicable. 
We do have information on whether or not these CdAs belong to a JdV and on the total number of users 
for all CdAs; in the analysis below, we present results for two specifications: those including just the 
information on membership in a JdV and number of users, and an additional specification (with fewer 
observations) for those with a functioning CdA. 
In terms of hypothesized impacts on households’ contribution decisions, group size is generally 
thought to increase under provision in public-good games mainly due to increased transaction costs. 
However, some authors have argued that the relationship between collective action and group size may be 
positive or have an inverted U-shape (consult Sandler 1992), particularly for lumpy investments or 
maintenance activities exhibiting increased returns to scale over the relevant range (e.g., hiring equipment 
                                                      
4 The relationship between consensus decision making and the number of members is negative, as might be expected; in 
fact, the simple correlation coefficient is -.15.  
  
Belongs to   
JdV 
Does Not Belong to  
JdV 
Outcome Variables  
  Value of labor provided to CdA (pesos)    4,851  12,653   
  Cash outlays to CdA (pesos)     12,624   27,449   
  Total value of labor and cash   17,474   4 0,102  
  Quota paid to JdV    39,494  
  Total CdA and JdV contributions    56,968   40,102   
   
  Net revenues per hectare    1,035,791   933,466   




to clean all the CdA canals or repairing the main intake). In these latter cases, very small memberships 
may make collective improvements very expensive, while larger memberships reduce the required per 
member contributions. At some point, however, transaction costs will offset gains from reduced per 
member requirements, thus leading to lower overall contributions. We tested the U-shape hypothesis in 
the estimations below, using a quadratic specification; this specification did not reveal a U-shaped 
relation. Instead, we used the natural log of the number of members, which performed best in the 
estimations; this specification would capture increasing returns to membership at a lower rate as 
membership grows (and transaction costs figure more prominently). Next, we hypothesize that 
households located in communities that are members of higher-level JdVs should have lower 
contributions, as the JdV often organizes and spends resources on more than just the primary canal, as 
discussed above.  
For the smaller subset with functioning CdAs, we hypothesize that heterogeneity, captured by the 
land difference within the community, reduces contributions.
5  Greater connectedness of the CdA 
president to other actors in the irrigation system should increase contributions by increasing the CdA’s 
efficiency through increased information sharing, perhaps greater access to external resources, and better 
coordination. Finally, we include a dummy variable that equals 1 when the consensus method is used in 
decision making. On the one hand, voting should be more efficient, particularly in larger groups, but 
consensus may be more useful to successful negotiations when members have different incentives and 
constraints outside the landholding differences already accounted for in the estimations. A priori then, we 
have no specific hypothesis on this variable. 
Households 
In addition to labor and monetary contributions to the CdA, the relevant endogenous variables for the 
household are revenues per hectare and purchased inputs. Households grow a wide variety of different 
crops, including grains, contract crops, and perennials. Maize, wheat, rice, beans, and potatoes are 
commonly grown for domestic markets and local consumption. Raspberries are the primary export crop 
grown in the study area. Sugar beets and, to a far less extent, tomatoes are also produced, largely on a 
contractual basis. Five households did not cultivate any land, 13 households dedicated activities 
exclusively to livestock production, and 12 households planted a variety of “household-garden” crops on 
very small land areas (two-tenths of a hectare, on average). Because of the difficulty in valuing output per 
hectare from these farms, these observations were not used in this analysis. Finally, given available 
information on prices, an additional 18 observations were dropped for those households that produced 
crops with missing or no information on the relevant market rate.
6 For the remaining 270 households, 176 
grow row crops only, 54 grow only high-value crops (raspberries or sugar beets), and 37 grow both row 
crops and high-value crops. While such crops do entail different investments and input requirements, we 
aggregate gross returns per hectare, which then reflects both yields and the crop mix chosen.
7,8  We also 
run two factor equations, one being expenditures per hectare on purchased inputs such as pesticides, 
herbicides, and fertilizers, and the second being expenditures per hectare on labor and/or equipment hire. 
Exogenous Variables 
At the crux of the study are the questions regarding how and why households contribute to irrigation 
maintenance, given CdA characteristics and factors directly affecting household-level incentives. As 
                                                      
5 Though this is not a CdA “structure” variable, the question was not asked in communities without a formal CdA.  
6 Excluding only the 13 households that focused exclusively on livestock, the area cultivated in crops that were used in this 
analysis (wheat, maize, beans, rice, sugar beets, and raspberries) comprised 90 percent of the total area cultivated, on average.  
7 In the appendix, Table A.3, we present results for row crops separately, using a selection regression to account for the 
choice to grow row crops. Given the few observations on high-value crops, the selection regression never converged; thus, we 
cannot present results for this subset. Results for row crops are qualitatively similar to total gross revenues.  
8 Because certain households had very low yields for a variety of reasons (net revenues were negative for 18 households), 




noted in the discussion of the conceptual framework, a number of exogenous household- and community-
level characteristics will have different effects on a household’s contribution decision, use of purchased 
inputs, and total farm output. A full descriptive summary of the dependent and exogenous variables is 
reported in the appendix, in Table A.1. 
At the household level, human capital measures—such as labor availability, measured as the 
number of adults in a household; the age of a household head; and the average years of schooling for 
adults in the household—are hypothesized to have a positive effect on overall contributions, purchased 
inputs, and farm revenues. However, in terms of labor or monetary contributions, the sign on labor 
availability may be ambiguous, as poorer households with more labor may tend to avoid monetary 
contributions in favor of labor. Higher levels of education and experience within a community should 
positively influence a household’s contributions, to the extent that these variables increase the marginal 
returns to irrigation, thus leading to greater purchased inputs and farm revenues, both directly and 
indirectly. Farm management ability is captured by a dummy variable for whether or not the farm 
household maintains book-keeping records. Typically, households involved in keeping records are more 
cognizant of the optimal input mix, having learned from past experiences. The effect of book keeping is 
posited to have a positive relationship on contributions to the CdA, greater purchased inputs, and higher 
farm revenues, for similar reasons as education and experience. Total land endowments and the number 
of agricultural implements control for fixed inputs; both should lead to greater contributions to the CdA, 
to the extent that greater agricultural assets increase the marginal return to water. Given previous 
empirical work, gross returns and factor expenditures are likely to decrease or remain constant as the total 
land endowment increases. Agricultural assets may also have a positive or negative impact on gross 
returns and factor expenditures (though they should be positive for net returns), depending on the 
substitutability between such assets and other expenditures, for example, equipment hire. Household 
wealth, measured in terms of the number of consumer durables, controls for wealth differences across 
households. To the extent that greater wealth captures greater access to credit and reduced transaction 
costs in purchasing inputs and marketing outputs, greater wealth should lead to greater contributions to 
the CdA as well as more purchased inputs and higher overall net revenue. Finally, the distance to the 
nearest market is hypothesized to affect negatively contributions, purchased inputs, and farm revenue, as 
isolated households may face less pressure from social sanctions and the costs and the marginal revenue 
for marketing crops are lower. 
Means Test 
Given the hypothesized effect of household- and community-level variables, a cursory testing of means 
between contributors and noncontributors for each activity provides a useful baseline from which initial 
comparisons can be drawn and hypotheses tested. While means testing is not conditioned on other 
explanatory variables, the exercise is useful, as it can uncover stark differences between the contributors 
and noncontributors. Table A.2, in the appendix, summarizes the results for each contribution category, 
with the null hypothesis in each test being that the means between the two groups are equal. 
Of the 270 households, 157 provide labor to their local CdA. The means-testing exercise reveals 
that households living in communities with less land inequality and further away from agricultural 
markets give labor. Transitioning to monetary participation, the results show that 148 households provide 
money. Well-organized (book-keeping) households in well-connected CdAs are more likely to make 
monetary contributions. This may also reflect an advanced organizational capacity of the CdA. For 
households providing both labor and money, the results are similar. The following section extends the 




5. EMPIRICAL  APPROACH 
Modeling Participation and Contributions 
This study is primarily concerned with (1) evaluating the household- and community-level factors that 
affect a household’s decision to participate in yearly canal maintenance activities and (2) examining how 
variables that influence the contribution process also affect purchased input choices and farm revenues. 
The outcome variables of interest for the first question are the number of labor hours or pesos contributed. 
To analyze the first step of the problem, we must consider the possibility that an underlying decision 
process may directly influence the amounts contributed to each activity. Certain households may be more 
inclined to give labor rather than money, or vice versa.
9  If the sub-sample of labor contributors is not 
random, this selectivity may bias the coefficients in the regression estimating the number of labor hours 
contributed. To correct for this potential selection bias, we employ a Heckman two-step estimator to 
model each contribution process. In the first stage, we specify a probit regression for the binary decision 
to contribute labor (money/money or labor): 
*






where  X is a vector of exogenous household, community, and CdA characteristics influencing the 
participation decision and   is an error term with mean 0 and variance 1. The second stage then uses a 
truncated least-squares regression to estimate the level of contributions: 
*
i CX v   , observed if d = 1                        (9) 
where  X is a vector of exogenous household, community, and CdA characteristics influencing the 
participation decision and  i v is an error term. We assume that  i u and  i v take on a bivariate normal 
distribution (ui, vi) ~ N (0, 0, 1, σ2, ρ) and ρ is the correlation between the error terms. In the second step, 
we obtain unbiased estimates by including the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) for selectivity bias obtained from 
the estimation of the first equation. Statistical significance of the t-statistic on the IMR variable in the 
second stage supports the conjecture of selection bias in the sample. We also adjust standard errors for 
clustering at the CdA level. 
In total, the study uses three Heckman two-step estimators to model the contribution process of 
labor, money, and money and labor. Due to missing values for selected variables, the sample size is 
smaller than the total observations for each of the analyses. 
Purchased Inputs and Farm Revenues 
To determine how the exogenous household- and community-level characteristics influence variable input 
purchases and farm revenues, the study transforms the reduced form solutions above (equations 6 and 7) 
into a modified linear regression model: 
ln          ∑               ∑           /                       (10) 
 
ln                                        /                      
   (11) 
                                                      
9 Though the CdA-level surveys provided information on the amounts of money and labor requested, either per household or 
per number of water rights held, informal discussions as well as the descriptive statistics indicate that poorer households appear 
to informally substitute labor for money, and vice versa, despite the “fixed requests” for labor or monetary contributions reported 




where  i k is the logged value of variable input expenditures per hectare (pesticides and labor and/or 
machinery), farm revenues per hectare (Yi) are constructed as a logged sum of the revenues from the six 
primary crops grown among households in the sample (wheat, maize, rice, beans, raspberry, and sugar 
beet), the household- and community-level characteristics are those referred to in the descriptive analysis, 
and  i  is a stochastic error term. Because certain households may be more inclined to use certain inputs, 
the factor expenditure equation is also modeled using a Heckman two-step estimator similar to the one 
above. Farm revenues are modeled using ordinary least squares (OLS) with adjusted standard errors for 
clustering at the CdA level.
10   Missing variables in the data limit the revenue analysis to 262 households. 
                                                      
10 We also considered a stochastic production frontier model. We found that because of the different crop mixes across 




6. EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
Labor and Monetary Participation and Contributions 
Tables 2–3, below, present the Heckman two-step estimator results from the contribution process. Table 2 
reports two specifications for labor participation and subsequent contributions. The first specification 
indicates that households with fewer agricultural assets and those in communities that are not part of JdVs 
are more likely to provide labor contributions. The statistical significance of the incidental variable in the 
second-stage regression confirms potential selection bias for labor contributions. Given that a household 
contributes labor, the amount of labor contributed is largely determined by the amount of land and 
agricultural assets owned, with both variables having a positive influence on contributions. Results from a 
second specification, adding additional CdA control variables as well as a measure of community 
heterogeneity (land difference), are also reported. The results are similar to those of the first specification, 
with the same variables influencing participation. Group size appears to have a negative effect on labor 
participation. Owning more land and agricultural assets again positively affects labor contributions. 
Table 3 summarizes the results for monetary participation and contribution amounts. The first 
specification indicates that whether or not a household undertakes book keeping strongly influences 
participation. Conditional on participation, the second stage suggests that owning more land increases 
contribution amounts, whereas membership in a JdV reduces contributions. The second specification 
shows a stronger effect on monetary participation decisions than was the case for labor participation. CdA 
connections and making decisions by consensus are both statistically significant and positive, suggesting 
that a socially connected CdA president and the more time-consuming but flexible consensus decision-
making process are essential for inducing monetary participation. The need to control for selection bias 
vanishes in the second stage, as the incidental variable is no longer significant. Owning more land 
positively influences the amount of money contributed (a 1 percent change in landholdings increases 
monetary contributions by about 0.42 percent), whereas JdV membership decreases monetary 
contributions.  
The analysis is rounded out in Table 4, with similar variables driving the decision and 
contribution process for both labor and money. One noticeable difference is the positive effect of the 
household labor supply on the participation decision. The importance of land differences, CdA 
connections, and consensus voting reappear in the second stage for the second specification.  
In summary, the first round of analysis suggests that, for labor participation, households that do 
not belong to JdVs and that own few agricultural assets are more likely to participate. Of the households 
contributing labor, agricultural assets and the amount of land owned strongly influence the number of 
labor hours given. Land differences have little to no statistically significant effect on any of the 
contribution decisions. At the community level, the size of the CdA negatively affects the probability that 
a household will contribute labor or both money and labor. CdA size also tends to reduce the amount of 
labor contributed. There is no effect on monetary participation. The connections of a CdA president 
moderately affect monetary participation and contributions, and strongly influence the amount of labor 
and money contributed. JdV membership tends to reduce participation and contribution amounts across 




Table 2. Labor participation results 








   [First Stage]  [Second Stage]  [First Stage]  [Second Stage] 
Total adults in household  0.052  -0.034  0.0672  0.0221 
  [0.0619] [0.0430] [0.0651] [0.0427] 
Age of household head (logged)  -0.2831  -0.0805  -0.8240**  -0.3659 
  [0.3379] [0.2691] [0.3545] [0.3176] 
Average education  0.0480*  0  0.0389  0.0256 
  [0.0259] [0.0136] [0.0315] [0.0204] 
Book  keeping  -0.2505  0.0447 -0.1582 -0.0961 
  [0.1964] [0.1104] [0.1806] [0.1401] 
Land owned (logged)  0.1216*  0.1218**  0.1390**  0.1901***
  [0.0701] [0.0526] [0.0670] [0.0512] 
Agricultural assets  -0.2728*** 0.1893*** -0.3028***  -0.0324 
  [0.0900] [0.0677] [0.0919] [0.0593] 
Distance to nearest agricultural  market  0.0136 0.0097 0.0400**  0.0166 
  [0.0182] [0.0102] [0.0204] [0.0115] 
Durables  0.0654 0.0217 0.1083**  0.0744** 
  [0.0513] [0.0331] [0.0497] [0.0332] 
CdA belongs to JdV  -0.8205*** -0.0241  -0.8345***  -0.5035***
  [0.2499] [0.1632] [0.2658] [0.1931] 
CdA size (members)  -0.2215  -0.1312  -0.3454**  -0.2591* 
  [0.1418] [0.0992] [0.1520] [0.1354] 
CdA connections  -  -  -0.1275  -0.0138 
 -  -  [0.1508]  [0.1369] 
CdA decisions made by consensus  -  -  -0.0316  0.0632 
 -  -  [0.2158]  [0.1916] 
Land difference  -  -  -0.0006  -0.0002 
 -  -  [0.0021]  [0.0016] 
Constant 1.647  1.5247  3.7729***  1.9935 
  [1.4608] [1.1216] [1.4452] [1.3812] 
Athrho -  -0.7174*  -  1.3749***
  - [0.4315]  - [0.2689] 
Lnsigma  - -0.3742*** - -0.2647***
  - [0.1075]  - [0.0866] 
Observations  270 270 244 244 
Notes: The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Robust standard errors are in brackets. 




Table 3. Monetary participation results 








   [First Stage]  [Second Stage]  [First Stage]  [Second Stage] 
Total adults in household  0.0977  -0.0018  0.0746  0.1117 
  [0.0815] [0.1488] [0.0853] [0.1068] 
Age of household head (logged)  0.6235  -0.6126  0.4837  0.3087 
  [0.3968] [0.5884] [0.4017] [0.2857] 
Average  education  0.0305  -0.0195 0.0206 0.0081 
  [0.0223] [0.0329] [0.0291] [0.0201] 
Book keeping  0.6458*** -0.243  0.6711**  0.3688 
  [0.2466] [0.4535] [0.2797] [0.2695] 
Land owned (logged)  -0.0544  0.4482*** -0.0906  0.4147***
  [0.0692] [0.1017] [0.0825] [0.0724] 
Agricultural assets  -0.0249  0.0383  0.0022  -0.0558 
  [0.1032] [0.1517] [0.1206] [0.0760] 
Distance to nearest agricultural market  -0.0035  -0.0184  -0.01  -0.021 
  [0.0144] [0.0177] [0.0147] [0.0152] 
Durables 0.014  -0.0473  0.0503  -0.0097 
  [0.0449] [0.0711] [0.0517] [0.0501] 
CdA belongs to JdV  0.3188  -1.0065*** 0.3148  -0.7618***
  [0.2641] [0.2515] [0.2823] [0.2802] 
CdA size (members)  -0.0144  0.1464  0.0539  0.1428 
  [0.1517] [0.1169] [0.1794] [0.1759] 
CdA connections  -  -  0.5304*** 0.1782* 
 -  -  [0.1558]  [0.0985] 
CdA decisions made by consensus  -  -  0.5985**  0.143 
 -  -  [0.2477]  [0.1657] 
Land difference  -  -  0.0001  -0.0013 
 -  -  [0.0024]  [0.0021] 
Constant -3.3385*  13.1924*** -3.2980*  7.4666***
  [1.7816] [2.9759] [1.8146] [1.5768] 
Athrho -  -1.4664*** -  -0.1196 
 -  [0.4383]  -  [0.1217] 
Lnsigma -  0.4517*  -  -0.1484* 
 -  [0.2683]  -  [0.0884] 
Observations  270 270 244 244 
Notes: The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Robust standard errors are in brackets. 









Total Monetary Value 




Total Monetary Value 
(labor & money) 
   [First Stage]  [Second Stage]  [First Stage]  [Second Stage] 
Total adults in household  0.3086*** -0.0709  0.3053***  0.0428 
  [0.0736] [0.1027]  [0.0833] [0.0727] 
Age of household head (logged)  1.3582**  -0.3876  0.4786  -0.0541 
  [0.6086] [0.3749]  [0.6407] [0.2753] 
Average education  0.0919**  0.0161  0.0652*  0.0235 
  [0.0384] [0.0189]  [0.0393] [0.0145] 
Book keeping  0.3712  0.1776  0.4846*  0.2599* 
  [0.2729] [0.1882]  [0.2910] [0.1562] 
Land owned (logged)  0.0911  0.2549***  0.0644  0.2913*** 
  [0.0939] [0.0706]  [0.1179] [0.0654] 
Agricultural assets  -0.3565**  0.1511*  -0.3086  -0.0007 
  [0.1722] [0.0910]  [0.1941] [0.0499] 
Distance to nearest agricultural 
market  -0.0254 0.0154  -0.0188  -0.0057 
  [0.0239] [0.0169]  [0.0365] [0.0119] 
Durables 0.0274  0.007  0.1109*  0.0136 
  [0.0664] [0.0382]  [0.0619] [0.0289] 
CdA belongs to JdV  -0.5626*  -0.3076  -0.7866*  -0.4971** 
  [0.3048] [0.2686]  [0.4565] [0.2146] 
CdA size (members)  -0.3066*  0.044  -0.5007**  0.1305 
  [0.1745] [0.1512]  [0.2290] [0.1530] 
CdA connections  -  -  0.0378  0.2714*** 
 -  -  [0.2512]  [0.0972] 
CdA decisions made by consensus  -  -  0.0073  0.2933* 
 -  -  [0.3046]  [0.1687] 
Land difference  -  -  0.006  -0.0026* 
 -  -  [0.0038]  [0.0016] 
Constant -4.1131*  10.6028***  -0.3884  8.8563*** 
  [2.4364] [1.6979]  [2.6437] [1.3727] 
Athrho -  -1.3187***  -0.7069   
  - [0.4286]  - [0.4601] 
Lnsigma -  0.1381  -  -0.1543** 
  - [0.1660]  - [0.0781] 
Observations  270 270 244 244 
Notes: The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Robust standard errors are in brackets. 




Table 5. Pesticide expenditure results 








   [First Stage]  [Second Stage]  [First Stage]  [Second Stage] 
Total adults in household  -0.0912  -0.0503  -0.1028*  -0.0862 
  [0.0607] [0.0672] [0.0562] [0.0743] 
Age of household head (logged)  -0.6284*  0.3124  -0.557  0.1159 
  [0.3402] [0.3601] [0.3415] [0.3444] 
Average  education  0.0258 0.0317 0.021  0.0376 
  [0.0291] [0.0222] [0.0345] [0.0248] 
Book  keeping  0.3339 0.2575 0.2758 0.2382 
  [0.2290] [0.1691] [0.2491] [0.1773] 
Land owned (logged)  0.2897*** -0.2504*** 0.3286***  -0.2145***
  [0.0827] [0.0765] [0.1005] [0.0649] 
Agricultural  assets  0.2552** -0.1317*  0.2765** -0.118 
  [0.1180] [0.0776] [0.1204] [0.0781] 
Distance to nearest agricultural market  0.0002 -0.0294*** 0.0075 -0.0288** 
  [0.0184] [0.0099] [0.0196] [0.0125] 
Durables  -0.0259 -0.0038 -0.0284 -0.017 
  [0.0479] [0.0304] [0.0560] [0.0300] 
CdA belongs to JdV  0.3486  0.09  0.7135***  0.1048 
  [0.2462] [0.1322] [0.2485] [0.1544] 
CdA size (members)  -0.2202*  -0.1443**  0.0034  -0.1722 
  [0.1237] [0.0719] [0.1538] [0.1155] 
CdA connections  -  -  0.2136  -0.044 
 -  -  [0.1350]  [0.0752] 
CdA decisions made by consensus  -  -  0.2855  0.0734 
 -  -  [0.1794]  [0.1135] 
Land difference  -  -  -0.0063**  0.0012 
 -  -  [0.0027]  [0.0018] 
Constant  1.5397 10.8093*** 2.6537* 9.9797***
  [1.6001] [1.4120] [1.4546] [1.4275] 
Athrho  - -0.0367  - -0.0219 
  - [0.1319]  - [0.2424] 
Lnsigma  - -0.2862*** - -0.2688***
  - [0.0761]  - [0.0704] 
Observations  270 270 244 244 
Notes: The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Robust standard errors are in brackets. 




Table 6. Labor/machinery expenditures 
Dependent Variable  Labor/Machinery 
Participation 
Total Expenditures 




(labor & machinery) 
   [First Stage]  [Second Stage]  [First Stage]  [Second Stage] 
Total adults in household  0.03  -0.0722  0.0156  -0.0687 
  [0.0908] [0.0467]  [0.0968] [0.0446] 
Age of household head (logged)  0.0627  -0.1289  0.3187  0.063 
  [0.3942] [0.2517]  [0.4062] [0.2947] 
Average education  0.012  0.0162  0.0196  0.0219 
  [0.0289] [0.0233]  [0.0322] [0.0229] 
Book  keeping  0.122  0.7740*** 0.0885 0.6215*** 
  [0.2720] [0.1682]  [0.2943] [0.1592] 
Land owned (logged)  0.4333***  -0.1959***  0.4329***  -0.1630*** 
  [0.0903] [0.0583]  [0.0990] [0.0610] 
Agricultural  assets  0.1032 -0.3679***  0.1339 -0.3795*** 
  [0.1371] [0.0590]  [0.1397] [0.0606] 
Distance to nearest agricultural market  0.0062  0.0081  0.026  0.0123 
  [0.0191] [0.0098]  [0.0200] [0.0099] 
Durables  -0.0779 0.0366  -0.0584 0.047 
  [0.0565] [0.0333]  [0.0605] [0.0345] 
CdA  belongs  to  JdV  -0.0218 0.4315*** 0.1308 0.5460*** 
  [0.1972] [0.1543]  [0.2458] [0.1718] 
CdA  size  (members)  -0.0525 -0.1859*** -0.0746 -0.1429 
  [0.1332] [0.0665]  [0.1617] [0.1230] 
CdA connections  -  -  -0.071  -0.0286 
 -  -  [0.1503]  [0.0923] 
CdA decisions made by consensus  -  -  0.5217**  -0.011 
 -  -  [0.2204]  [0.1437] 
Land difference  -  -  -0.0001  -0.0017 
 -  -  [0.0028]  [0.0020] 
Constant  0.1603 11.8919*** 10.9229***  -1.4298 
  [1.7555] [1.1273]  [1.3197] [1.9307] 
Athrho  - 0.0439  - 0.0065 
  - [0.1105]  - [0.1567] 
Lnsigma  - -0.0876  - -0.1408** 
  - [0.0750]  - [0.0631] 
Observations 270  270  244  244 
Notes: The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Robust standard errors are in brackets. 




Factor Expenditure Results 
Tables 5 and 6, above, summarize the results from the factor expenditure equations. First-stage results 
point out that agricultural assets and the amount of land owned are the primary farm-level characteristics 
driving the decision to purchase pesticides. At the CdA level, group size negatively influences the 
decision, though the effect vanishes across specifications. Given that a household purchases pesticide 
inputs, owning more land and agricultural assets and belonging to a large CdA negatively affect 
expenditures. However, moving to the second specification, the results are somewhat different. First, 
whether or not a CdA belongs to a JdV strongly influences the decision to purchase pesticides, whereas 
CdA heterogeneity tends to reduce participation. While CdA characteristics may affect the decision to 
purchase pesticide inputs, they appear to have minimal influence on expenditure amounts. The quantity of 
land owned and the distance to the nearest agricultural market negatively affect pesticide expenditures. 
The story differs for labor and machinery expenditures, summarized in Table 6. The amount of 
land owned again positively influences the decision to purchase labor or machinery inputs, but negatively 
affects the total amount purchased. Household book keeping and CdA membership in a JdV both have a 
positive effect on expenditure amounts. Moreover, focusing on the second specification, which adds 
additional CdA control variables, we see that voting by consensus has a substantial positive impact on 
whether or not a household decides to purchase labor or machinery inputs. Together, these results 
demonstrate that certain CdA characteristics may influence the binary decision to purchase a certain type 
of input, whereas other CdA connections, especially membership in a higher-level JdV, are essential in 
determining how much income a household allocates to factor input purchases. 
Farm Revenues 
Table 7 presents the results from three different OLS specifications for farm revenues. The first model is 
parsimonious and focuses on core household and CdA characteristics. The signs on all the coefficients are 
mostly consistent with expectations, yet only average education, whether or not a household kept 
agricultural books, and the distance to the nearest agricultural market were statistically significant. The 
second specification includes additional CdA control variables. At the household level, education and 
book keeping again have a positive and statistically significant effect on revenue, whereas agricultural 
assets and distance to the nearest market have negative effects. A larger CdA, in terms of the number of 
members, and the social connections of the president both positively influence revenues, but land 
differences slightly reduce the dependent variable. 
To summarize, older, more educated households with greater managerial capacity earn more 
revenues on average. At the community level, households located in larger CdAs with a well-connected 
CdA president have higher farm revenues. But in CdAs whose members have vastly different 





Table 7. Farm revenue results (all crops) 
Dependent Variable   Farm Revenues I  Farm Revenues II
Total adults in household  -0.0324  -0.008 
  [0.0329] [0.0292] 
Age of household head (logged)  0.1904  0.2222 
  [0.1594] [0.1739] 
Average education  0.0321***  0.0360*** 
  [0.0114] [0.0131] 
Book keeping  0.3077**  0.2689* 
  [0.1222] [0.1428] 
Land owned (logged)  -0.0713  -0.0446 
  [0.0445] [0.0472] 
Agricultural assets  -0.0827  -0.0920* 
  [0.0496] [0.0450] 
Distance to nearest agricultural market  -0.0192**  -0.0197** 
  [0.0081] [0.0079] 
Durables  0.0097 0.007 
  [0.0223] [0.0245] 
CdA belongs to JdV  0.0404  0.1746 
  [0.1098] [0.1183] 
CdA size (members)  0.0503  0.1837*** 
  [0.0555] [0.0598] 
CdA connections  -  0.1644** 
  - [0.0718] 
CdA decisions made by consensus  -  0.0142 
  - [0.0888] 
Land difference  -  -0.0035*** 
  - [0.0010] 
Constant  12.4253*** 11.8252*** 
  [0.7016] [0.9004] 
Observations  262 238 
R-squared  0.12 0.138 
Notes: The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Robust standard errors are in brackets. 
Source: Authors 
Simulating Policy Interventions 
Based on the above analyses, CdA connections and community land differences appear to have opposing 
effects on monetary contributions and farm revenues. This result induces us to ask what the effect would 
be of an intervention maximizing the social connections of a CdA president while at the same time 
ameliorating the negative incentives to contribute money based on heterogeneity in landholdings. To 
estimate the consequences of such an intervention, we run simulations on monetary contributions and 




differences to 0. The simulation results, presented in Tables 8 and 9 below, represent an upper bound on 
the potential gains. Under the intervention, monetary contributions increase, on average, by 9 percent 
(9.64 to 10.50), while farm revenues jump by 11 percent (13.32 to 14.73). These results are encouraging 
from a policy perspective, as they suggest the need for programs to connect CdA presidents across groups 
and to ameliorate the negative effects of landholding differences on contributions. The final section 
discusses these policy implications from a broader perspective, integrating the results from all the models. 
Table 8. Simulation results for monetary contributions 
Monetary Contributions          
   Sample Mean  Coefficient Value  Total 
Total adults in household  2.7491  0.1117  0.3071
Age of household head (logged)  4.0186  0.3087  1.2405
Average education  7.0336  0.0081  0.0569
Book keeping  0.5472  0.3688  0.2018
Land owned (logged)  1.7645  0.4147  0.7318
Agricultural assets  0.8218  -0.0558  -0.0459
Distance to nearest agricultural market  1.6251  -0.0210  -0.0342
Durables 6.2764  -0.0097  -0.0608
CdA belongs to JdV  0.5564  -0.7618  -0.4239
CdA size (members)  3.2794  0.1428  0.4682
Land difference  0.0000  -0.0013  0.0000
CdA connections  3.0000  0.1782  0.5345
CdA decisions made by consensus  0.4145  0.1430  0.0593
Constant  ‐  7.4666 - 
Predicted value (mean) / simulated value     9.639986 10.502 
Percentage change        9% 




Table 9. Simulation results for farm revenues 
Farm Revenues          
   Sample Mean  Coefficient Value  Total 
Total adults in household  2.7491 -0.0080  -0.0221
Age of household head (logged)  4.0186 0.2222  0.8929
Average education  7.0336 0.0360  0.2532
Book keeping  1.7645 0.2689  0.4745
Land owned (logged)  0.8218 -0.0446  -0.0366
Agricultural assets  1.6251 -0.0920  -0.1495
Distance to nearest agricultural market  6.2764 -0.0197  -0.1238
Durables 67.4807 0.0070  0.4741
CdA belongs to JdV  3.2794 0.1746  0.5725
CdA size (members)  0.3927 0.1837  0.0721
Land difference  0.000  -0.0035  0.0000
CdA connections  3.000  0.1644  0.4932
CdA decisions made by consensus  0.4308 0.0142  0.0061
Constant -  11.8252  11.8252
Predicted value (mean) / simulated value     13.31881  14.7318
Percentage change        11%





This article uses combined household- and community-level data collected from the Maule Region (VII) 
of Chile to evaluate factors affecting the decision to participate in yearly irrigation maintenance activities, 
and the impacts of current behavior on input purchase and farm revenues. A theoretical model is 
developed to highlight the impact of the decision to provide irrigation maintenance (through 
contributions) on the simultaneous decision to purchase private inputs and thus on total agricultural 
output. The empirical analysis reveals that CdA characteristics explain much of the variation in 
participation decisions, contribution amounts, and subsequent farm revenues. Similar to previous 
researchers, we find that group heterogeneity, captured by landholding differences within the CdA 
community, de-incentivizes households to contribute to irrigation maintenance activities and also lowers 
farm revenues. However, although CdA size tends to reduce labor-based participation, the effect on 
revenues is positive, indicating that an irrigation group may need to reach a minimum size to effectively 
implement canal maintenance activities. CdA membership in a higher-level JdV is detrimental to 
fostering support for CdA contributions but vital in the household’s decision to purchase inputs. 
Membership appears to affect household expenditures on labor and machinery. Finally, connecting CdA 
presidents to higher-level water authorities and to other CdA presidents appears to have a twofold effect. 
First, these connections appear to induce monetary participation and increase contributions across all 
categories. This in turn enables CdAs to keep canals well maintained, thus yielding higher revenues for 
farmers. 
To a policymaker, these findings are of direct relevance for two reasons. First, this study 
demonstrates the need for policy interventions that address CdA characteristics, specifically the need to 
account for economic heterogeneity among members and to lower the transaction costs of maintaining 
connections with other irrigation authorities—be it neighboring CdAs or the JdV. While an intervention 
may not be able to redistribute land, it can assist CdAs in recognizing and addressing the cost that group 
heterogeneity imposes on canal maintenance funding, activities, and thus factor expenditures and farm 
revenues. Alternatively, programs that connect CdA presidents both laterally, across groups, and 
vertically, to higher-level water authorities, should have positive effects on the ability of the CdAs to 
improve management of the internal canal infrastructure, due to better information flows and coordination 
with neighboring CdAs, better coordination with the JdV, and perhaps better infrastructure and reliability 
of water flows at the turnout. The effect of these connections and the process by which they induce 
contribution participation and affect farm revenues deserves further research. 
Second, in light of the ever-changing climatic environment, our results suggest the need to 
critically analyze and carefully assess the ability of CdAs to manage resources. Although the Maule 
Region today relies on adequate mountain runoff, rising temperatures affecting the level of snowfall may 
place increasing pressure on CdAs and thus on household profit levels and welfare. As water levels ebb 
and flow, and water scarcity truly becomes an issue, marginal changes in CdA activities and/or 
characteristics may have dramatic effects on household welfare, food security, and overall irrigation 
infrastructure. The ability of the household, as well as the CdA, to adapt to climate change must be 
considered when assessing the impact. Thus, addressing CdA inefficiencies today may not only have 
immediate effects on household welfare; it may also enhance the ability of CdAs, and thus households, to 





Figure A.1.   Political map of Maule Region 
 




Table A.1. Summary statistics 
Dependent Variables             
Participation variables  Mean Std.  Deviation  Minimum/No  Maximum/Yes 
Labor   0.547  0.499  144  174 
Money 0.528  0.500  150  168 
Labor and money  0.862  0.346  250  68 
Contribution variables        
Labor  days  2.096 3.328 0.000  30.000 
Total money (logged)  9.655  1.384  0.693  13.592 
Total monetary value  
of labor and money  8.338 3.522 0.000  13.592 
Input expenses       
Pesticide  5.40 5.40 0.000  12.43 
Labor/machinery   7.90 5.06 0.000  13.81 
Output variable      
Farm revenue  13.304  0.728  11.339  15.068 
Explanatory Variables       
Household-level       
Adults in household  2.7  1.162  1 7 
Age of household head (logged)  4.01  0.27  3.1  4.4 
Average education  7.2  3.7  0 18 
Book keeping  0.55  0.5  0 1 
Total input costs  12.8  1.5  9  16.6 
Land owned (logged)  1.6  1.5  -3.07  4.6 
Agricultural  assets  0.8 0.9 0  4 
Distance to nearest agricultural market  12.8  6.5  0  30 
Consumer  durables  6.2 2.0 0  11 
Received water on time  0.8  0.4  0  1 
Water user group–level       
CdA belongs to JdV  0.55  0.5  0  1 
CdA size (members)  40  47  10  200 
Land difference  64.1  56.5  1.5  200 
CdA  connections  0.39 0.74 0  3 
CdA decisions made by consensus  0.43  0.5  0  1 
Number of observations  318     




Table A.2. Means test by participation decision in water user associations 
   Labor Participation   Monetary Participation  Monetary and Labor Participation 
Characteristics No  Yes  t-test  No  Yes t-test No  Yes t-test  Total 
Household size  2.664  2.809  -0.984  2.639  2.838 -1.359  2.7  2.905 -1.188  2.748 
Age of household head (logged)  4.05  3.995  1.699 3.994 4.038  -1.358 4.031 3.976 1.455 4.018 
Average education  6.724  7.301  -1.348  6.671  7.38 -1.673  6.736  8.123 -2.806  7.06 
Book  keeping  0.593  0.58 0.218 0.443 0.703 -4.457  0.536  0.746 -2.997  0.585 
Land owned (logged hectares)  1.711  1.823  -0.649  1.569 1.947  -2.225 1.712 1.987  -1.365 1.776 
Agricultural assets  0.389  0.42  -0.436  0.344 0.459  -1.641 0.382 0.492  -1.335 0.407 
Truck  0.991 0.701 2.391 0.721 0.905  -1.519 0.85 0.73 0.84  0.822 
Distance to agricultural market  12.003  14.073  -2.543  13.54 12.931  0.746 12.613 15.159 -2.684 13.207 
Consumer durables  6.159  6.363  -0.821  5.951 6.547 -2.45 6.126 6.778  -2.273 6.278 
Land difference  81.868  57.221  3.326  54.296  77.224 -3.063 70.343 60.598  1.14 67.827 
CdA  connections  0.487 0.331 1.658 0.156 0.595 -4.901  0.333  0.603 -2.481  0.396 
CdA belongs to JdV  0.743  0.42  5.542  0.459 0.635  -2.934 0.589 0.444 2.035 0.556 
Pesticide  expenditures  3.444 3.156 2.909 3.225 3.319  -0.949 3.309  3.17 1.185 3.276 
Voting by consensus  0.381  0.439  -0.968  0.262 0.541  -4.794 0.333 0.683  -5.144 0.415 
Labor/machinery expenditures  5.515  6.289  -1.266  5.57 6.291  -1.187 5.752 6.666  -1.281 5.965 
Total revenue  12.464  12.716  -1.378  12.371  12.8 -2.382 12.492 13.007 -2.439 12.612 
Monetary  participation  0.752  0.401  6.074  - - - - - -  0.548 
Labor  participation  - - -  0.77  0.426  6.074  - - -  0.581 
Total 113  157  ‐  122 148  ‐  207 63  ‐  270 




Table A.3. Grains and high-value crops 








Total adults in household  0.0472  -0.0731*  0.0746  -0.0348 
 [0.0796]  [0.0416]  [0.0970]  [0.0327] 
Age of household head (logged)  0.315  0.2995**  0.1977  0.3342** 
 [0.3774]  [0.1522]  [0.4400]  [0.1485] 
Average education  0.029  0.0323**  0.0227  0.0317** 
 [0.0293]  [0.0135]  [0.0347]  [0.0131] 
Book keeping  -0.3104  0.0486  -0.3342  -0.0049 
 [0.2219]  [0.1221]  [0.2196]  [0.1225] 
Land owned (logged)  0.4000***  0.1093***  0.3919***  0.1251*** 
 [0.0930]  [0.0387]  [0.1007]  [0.0353] 
Agricultural assets  0.0371  -0.0111  0.0572  -0.0194 
 [0.0985]  [0.0543]  [0.1007]  [0.0460] 
Distance to nearest agricultural market  0.0244  -0.0116  0.0202  -0.012 
 [0.0230]  [0.0100]  [0.0227]  [0.0114] 
Durables -0.1252**  0.0001  -0.1294**  0.000 
 [0.0526]  [0.0276]  [0.0562]  [0.0321] 
Land difference  -  -  0.0005  -0.0043*** 
 -  -  [0.0030]  [0.0013] 
CdA belongs to JdV  -0.1494  -0.1311  -0.28  0.0401 
 [0.2818]  [0.1339]  [0.3385]  [0.1393] 
CdA size (members)  0.1658  0.0947  0.2221*  0.2646*** 
 [0.1106]  [0.0673]  [0.1203]  [0.0653] 
CdA connections  -  -  0.3580*  0.2039** 
 -  -  [0.1944]  [0.0943] 
CdA decisions made by consensus  -  -  0.2381  0.1285 
 -  -  [0.2855]  [0.1122] 
Constant -1.2777  11.3581***  -1.0743  10.6010*** 
 [1.6829]  [0.7471]  [2.0938]  [0.8444] 
Athrho -  0.3204**  -  0.3707* 
 -  [0.1329]  -  [0.2116] 
Lnsigma -  -0.4472***  -  -0.4803*** 
 -  [0.0584]  -  [0.0750] 
Observations 270  270  244  244 
Uncensored observations  -  209  -  191 
Notes: The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Robust standard errors are in brackets. 
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